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ABSTRACT
In the wake of scandals about the radicalization of hate groups
online, Germany passed the Network Enforcement Act (“NetzDG”) to
prevent hate speech online. In the months after NetzDG went into effect,
social media platforms began engaging in overcorrection of hate
speech online. This includes censorship and a new commitment to
adhering to the strictest speech laws. In response, German and global
citizens alike have answered with backlash against the rise of
censorship in Europe. Despite this, Germany continues to stand by its
laws as a steadfast protection of the rights and dignity of the German
people. The conflict of these protections finds itself in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly Article 19. The
Human Rights Council has called into question NetzDG, arguing that
the measure violates the freedom of expression. This Note will review
the Network Enforcement Act for violations of freedom of expression
law. After thorough analysis, this Note will suggest remedies to correct
any potential violations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In January of 2018, Beatrix von Storch found herself under
investigation for inciting hate speech on Twitter. 1 She also found
herself and her colleague Alice Weidel temporarily blocked from the
platform. 2 The women, both members of Germany’s far right
Alternative for Germany (“AfD”) party, had condemned the Cologne
police for tweeting a New Year’s greeting in Arabic. 3 Twitter removed
the tweets within twenty-four hours, stating that each was manifestly
unlawful. 4 In the same fell swoop, Twitter removed several tweets from
the satirical magazine Titanic that had parodied von Storch and Weidel
for their regressive views on Islam. 5 Despite criticism, the offending
tweets stayed down. 6

1. Linda Kestler, Germany’s Attempt to Fix Facebook Is Backfiring, ATLANTIC (May 18,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/germany-facebook-afd/
560435/ [https://perma.cc/VBE9-P2W6]. An English translation of the tweet reads: “What the
hell is going on in this country? Why is an official police page from NRW tweeting in Arabic?
Do you think you’ll appease the barbarian, Muslim, gang-raping hordes of men?” Shona Gosh,
Germany’s Strict New Law About Hate Speech Has Already Claimed Its First Victim, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/germany-is-investigating-far-rightmp-beatrix-von-storch-after-a-strict-social-media-hate-speech-law-2018-1
[https://perma.cc/VK27-ESBV].
2. Gosh, supra note 1.
3. Kestler, supra note 1.
4. Kestler, supra note 1.
5. Attila Mong, As German Hate Speech Law Sinks Titanic Twitter Post, Critics Warn
New Powers Go Too Far, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://cpj.org/blog/2018/01/as-german-hate-speech-law-sinks-titanics-twitter-p.php
[https://perma.cc/ND67-ZN8X]; Kestler, supra note 1.
6. Kestler, supra note 1.
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Twitter removed these German tweets as part of its enforcement
of Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (“NetzDG”). 7 The law has gained
notoriety as the most comprehensive response to the problems of
radicalization on social media yet enacted in a democratic country. 8
Under NetzDG, Germany compels social media platforms to remove
any content deemed unlawful within seven days of its appearance
online. 9 For content that is “manifestly unlawful,” platforms have
twenty-four hours to remove the content. 10 Non-compliance with these
terms could make platforms criminally liable for up to EU€5 million.11
In fear of NetzDG, social media platforms have overcorrected the
hate speech crisis on the internet. Germany began enforcing NetzDG
in January of 2018, yet there is a very small amount of reported
content. 12 However, according to Facebook’s transparency report in
July 2018, the networking site had deleted over two million posts in six
months worldwide. 13 In response, the German population has
documented exactly which posts Facebook is removing. 14 While some
of the removed posts could be manifested hate speech, arguably like
Beatrix von Storch’s tweet about Muslims, others are valuable artistic
and political critiques, such as Titanic’s tweets satirizing the
exchanges.
NetzDG raises the issue of whether or not Germany is violating
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR” or “the Covenant”). 15 Article 19 guarantees freedom of
7. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], July 12, 2017,
available at https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_
engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 [https://perma.cc/D8MY-5ASG] [hereinafter NetzDG].
8. Germany: Flawed Social Media Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law
[https://perma.cc/325N-6QQR]; Germany Looks to Revise Social Media Law as Europe
Watches, CNBC (Mar. 8, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/08/germany-looksto-revise-social-media-law-as-europe-watches.html [https://perma.cc/2MPZ-AD2A].
9. NetzDG, supra note 7, § 3 no. 2.3.
10. Id. § 3 no. 2.2.
11. Id. § 4 no. 2.
12. Reporters Without Borders, The Network Enforcement Act Apparently Leads to
Excessive Blocking of Content, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://rsf.org/en/news/network-enforcement-act-apparently-leads-excessive-blocking-content
[https://perma.cc/F92A-XQ9U].
13. Id.
14. FACEBOOK – SPERRE [FACEBOOK WALL OF SHAME], https://facebook-sperre.
steinhoefel.de/ [https://perma.cc/45S4-5T74].
15. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 2200A, at
49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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expression, but explicitly carves out an exception for speech targeted
at another person’s dignity. 16 However, NetzDG overregulates what
should be a very narrowly tailored provision. 17 The law thus has a
chilling effect on political speech, and censorship is a real risk. 18
In June of 2017, David Kaye, Special Rapporteur of the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, issued a mandate expressing concern over Germany’s most
recent law regulating internet speech. 19 Germany in turn responded to
Kaye’s letter by defending its legislation. 20 It argued that such
measures were necessary in the wake of the fake news era, 21 Russian
interference in foreign elections through social media, and rampant
radicalization of hate groups online. 22 Indeed, much of Germany’s new
law is consistent with prior hate speech legislation deemed acceptable
by the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”). 23 Ultimately, this law is

16. Id.
17. See infra Section III.B.
18. See Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship
Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1048 (2018) (referencing NetzDG as part of the scope
of greater censorship on the internet in Europe).
19. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right of Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Letter dated June 1, 2017 from the Special Rapporteur to the Federal
Government
of
Germany,
U.N.
Doc.
OL/DEU/1/2017
(June
1,
2017).
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-DEU-1-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7WNL-ML9A] [hereinafter Kaye Letter].
20. German Government response to the Special Rapporteur (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/GermanyReply9Aug2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8K9B-3YC8] [hereinafter German Kaye Response].
21. “Fake news” refers to the phenomenon of false, uncorroborated information spreading
around the internet. This misinformation can have disastrous consequences. Shankar Vendatam
et al., Fake News: An Origin Story, NPR (June 28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/25/
623231337/fake-news-an-origin-story [https://perma.cc/S3KE-SYFS]. For example, there was
an online theory that Hillary Clinton was running a child sex traffic ring underneath a pizzeria.
Marc Fisher et al., Pizzagate: From Rumor, To Hashtag, To Gunfire In D.C., WASH. POST (Dec.
6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pizzagate-from-rumor-to-hashtag-to-gunfirein-dc/2016/12/06/4c7def50-bbd4-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.html?utm_term=.
4e3d4f24821a [https://perma.cc/X63G-MMDQ]. A man who believed this “fake news” opened
fire on the pizzeria in question. Id. But see Jessica Stone-Erdman, Just the (Alternative) Facts,
Ma’am: The Status of Fake News Under the First Amendment, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 410,
412 (2017) (discussing the dangers of Trump devaluing journalism).
22. Id.
23. See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107,
1118 (2011) (asserting the ICCPR values dignity as a human right). See generally Ryan
Kraski, Combating Fake News in Social Media: U.S. and German Legal Approaches, 91 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 923, 931, 939 (2017) (arguing that Germany’s social media policies are driven
by the civil right of dignity).
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Germany’s attempt to curtail the ominous effects of the
“disinformation wars” perpetuating over the internet. 24
This Note will outline NetzDG’s violations of international
human rights law, but also reiterate that that is not the end of the
discussion. NetzDG is a potentially powerful tool to fight the onslaught
of radicalization online; thus, it is important to acknowledge its
successes and strive to preserve them. Part II of this Note examines
how international human rights law operates in relation to speech.25
Part III of this Note outlines the reasons for NetzDG, as well as its place
amongst German hate speech law. 26 Part IV of this Note analyzes
NetzDG’s problems with proportionality, contrasted with the important
protections it strives to bring. 27 Part V of this Note briefly compares
Germany’s efforts to protect users from online hate speech to the
failures in the United States to protect users from the same. 28 Finally,
Part VI suggests ways in which Germany could narrow NetzDG,
collaborate with social media platforms, and set an example for how to
best deal with hate speech on the internet and protect the rights of its
own citizens. 29
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET
In order to determine whether NetzDG is in violation of
international human rights law, it is important to understand the
foundations of international freedom of expression guarantees. Section
II.A explains some of the enforcement mechanisms available under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly
Germany’s commitment to it. 30 Section II.B evaluates Article 19 and
its limitations amongst the other articles. 31 Section II.C explores the
particular emphasis the HRC recently placed on the internet in relation
to international human rights. 32

24. Waging War with Disinformation, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/01/25/waging-war-with-disinformation
[https://perma.cc/BR73-NS5T].
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See infra Part VI.
30. See infra Section II.A.
31. See infra Section II.B.
32. See infra Section II.C.
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A. German Compliance with Article 19 of the ICCPR
The ICCPR is a treaty that governs most of international human
rights law across multiple continents. 33 Entered into force in 1976, the
ICCPR provides expansive protections for dignity, liberty, and the right
to life. 34 As of August 2017, there are 172 signing parties to the ICCPR.
The ICCPR primarily operates through the countries that enforce
35
it. This approach is called “domestic primacy.” 36 Article 2(2) of the
ICCPR provides language granting states the discretion to implement
the covenant into their own laws. 37 This means that like many other
international treaties, the ICCPR relies on nations to incorporate the
terms of the treaty into their own domestic laws. 38 For example, the
United States implements Article 19 through the First Amendment to
its constitution, 39 New Zealand incorporated the ICCPR itself into its
own bill of rights, 40 and Germany expressly incorporated the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights into its constitution. 41 This is to prevent
overreach into the sovereignty of states. Thus, each of these states
provides a mechanism for private citizens to enforce their own rights
under their national law. 42
Despite the deferential nature of international human rights law,
the ICCPR provides ample mechanisms for enforcement on a global

33. ICCPR, supra note 15.
34. Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century, 35 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 25 (2006).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 15.
37. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 2(2) (“Where not already provided for by existing
legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the
necessary steps . . . to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to
the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”).
38. A prevalent critique of domestic primacy argues that it is too deferential to many
countries that would fall short of providing its citizens with the full human rights protections.
See, e.g., Ronald B. Hurdle & Walter J. Champion, Jr., ”The Life and Times of Napoleon
Beazley: The Effect (If Any) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on
Texas’ 17 & Up Execution Standard,” 28 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 2 (2002).
One salient example would be the United States’ use of the death penalty on minors.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 701 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
40. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (N.Z.), https://drive.google.com/file/d/
1go5yOZcZbmH4oknQs8XVxr5CI0CjkvxA/view?ts=5c9942b6
[https://perma.cc/GV68TPH7].
41. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf. The Declaration served as a precursor to the ICCPR.
42. Philip Chwee, Bringing in a New Scale: Proposing a Global Metric of Internet
Censorship, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 825, 864 (2015).
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scale. 43 The Human Rights Committee, a United Nations designated
enforcement body, 44 oversees the enforcement of these laws.45 The
HRC requires each nation to provide it with compliance reports upon
ratification and then any time after when the HRC so requests. 46 The
HRC will comment on each nation’s ability to provide for each right in
the ICCPR. 47 The reports must specifically reference the ways in which
domestic law is affecting the rights in question. 48
The ICCPR also provides mechanisms for other countries to
enforce human rights actions against each other. 49 Any party to the
Covenant may bring an action for enforcement against another party to
the covenant. 50 These actions, however, are difficult to bring because
they require extensive procedure before the moving state may even
bring the action. 51
The most novel tool of the ICCPR is Optional Protocol. 52 Optional
Protocol is a mechanism that allows private citizens to petition to the
International Court of Justice for violations of their own rights. 53 It is
one of the only mechanisms by which private citizens can enforce
international law against their own countries. 54 The mechanism is not

43. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 440
(Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2010); JOHN CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 377 (Irwin
Law ed., 2001).
44. GREGORY GISVOLD & SCOTT N. CARLSON, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 4-5 (Transnational Publishers
2003).
45. Donoho, supra note 34, at 25
46. Donoho, supra note 34, at 17 n.47.
47. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 40(4) (“The Committee shall study the reports submitted
by the States Parties to the present Covenant.”); see also GISVOLD & CARLSON, supra note 44,
at 5-6.
48. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 40(4) (“Reports shall indicate the factors and difficulties,
if any, affecting the implementation of the present Covenant.”).
49. GISVOLD & CARLSON, supra note 44, at 12-13.
50. Id.
51. Article 41 of the ICCPR articulates the process by which a state may use Article 40.
See ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 41.
52. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 33 on Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion
and
Expression,
¶
15,
U.N.
Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/33
(Nov.
5,
2008),
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/CCPR.C.GC.33.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D4BL5YC]; see also Antoine L. Collins, Caging the Bird Does Not Cage the Song: How the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Fails to Protect Free Expression over the
Internet, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 371, 383 (2003).
53. Collins, supra note 52, 383; Donoho, supra note 34, at 25.
54. Collins, supra note 52, at 383.
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a perfect one, 55 but it can be a powerful tool for individuals to vindicate
their rights in against a country in violation. 56
While some countries have been inconsistent with their
compliance, 57 Germany remains committed to providing
comprehensive proof of its compliance to human rights norms.58
Indeed, Germany willingly participates in Optional Protocol. 59 This is
an affirmative commitment that German citizens will have recourse if
their rights are violated. 60 Germany’s submission is one of many
indications of Germany’s dedication to protecting the human rights of
its citizens. 61
Germany is also subject to international human rights law through
the European Court of Human Rights. 62 Specifically, Europe protects
freedom of expression through the European Convention on Human
Rights (“ECHR”). 63 Article 10 of the ECHR has very similar language
as Article 19 of the ICCPR. 64

55. In order to bring an action against a country under Optional Protocol, a country must
have opted in to the procedure. See Chwee, supra note 45, at 831. Thus far, of the 160 ratifying
parties to the ICCPR, only 111 have opted in to Optional Protocol.
56. See GISVOLD & CARLSON, supra note 44, at 9-10.
57. See, e.g., Hurdle & Champion, Jr., supra note 38, at 6 (noting the failure of the United
States to comply with the ICCPR’s ban on executing minors). See also DUNOFF, supra note 43,
at 443.
58. Participants of the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, United Nations Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV5&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/48JA-HA2P].
59. Id.
60. Donoho, supra note 34, at 25.
61. Many eligible countries have not assented to Optional Protocol. Participants of the
ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, supra note 58. Further, a person must prove that he or she has
exhausted “all domestic remedies” before he or she may pursue Optional Protocol.
62. JAN OSTER, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW 29 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2017). To an extent, the European Court of Justice also protects the fundamental rights of
Europeans. See ELISA RAVASI, HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION BY THE ECTHR AND THE ECJ
(Brill Nijhoff ed., 2017).
63. The ECtHR and ECJ has had success with regional implementation of human rights
law. Donoho, supra note 34, at 44.
64. Compare ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 19(2) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
of all kinds regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.”) with Article 10 of the Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.,
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8F2M-FLGU]
(“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers.”) [hereinafter ECHR]. See also Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, art. 11(1) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
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Germany does exhibit some concerning behavior on matters of
freedom of expression, 65 but has proven itself sensitive to public
backlash and questions of its human rights reputation. In 2016, satirist
Jan Böhmermann published a poem about Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan online. 66 Among other things, the poem made fun of
Erdoğan’s genitalia and said that he had sexual relations with goats. 67
The speech technically violated Section 103 of Germany’s criminal
code, which outlaws insulting foreign leaders. 68 Erdoğan demanded
action from the German government, and, in a controversial move,
Chancellor Angela Merkel approved a criminal prosecution against the
comedian. 69
The jump to criminal prosecution under archaic speech law
exhibits extreme measures against predominantly innocuous offenses.
The poem did not incite violence or use racial slurs. 70 It was, however,
mostly a thorny, rude attack on a somewhat thin-skinned foreign
leader. 71 If anything, this was Böhmermann’s attempt to critique
German slander law. 72

right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority regardless of frontiers.”).
65. See, e.g., David Shimer, Germany Raids Homes of 36 People Accused of Hateful
Postings Over Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/
20/world/europe/germany-36-accused-of-hateful-postings-over-social-media.html (last visited
Mar. 18, 2019).
66. Alison Smale, Comedian’s Takedown of Turkish President Tests Free Speech in
Germany, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/world/europe/
jan-bohmermann-erdogan-neo-magazin-royale.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
67. Dr. Manfred Dauster, The German Court System in Combatting State Security
Matters, in Particular Terrorism, 42 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31, 54 (2017). The poem has not been
translated into English, but a German copy can be found here: Justiz-Portal, HAMBURG,DE,
http://justiz.hamburg.de/contentblob/6103298/6b1b7ae264e23809630af9d7716ef2fd/data/sch
maehgedicht-jan-boehmermann- pdfanhang.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVN8-AZ8A].
68. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], §103 http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1035
[https://perma.cc/A6EV-LPWZ].
(“Whosoever insults a foreign head of state . . . shall be liable to imprisonment . . . or a fine . . .
in a case of a slanderous insult to imprisonment from three months to five years.”).
69. Ashley Cowburn, Angela Merkel Accepts Turkish Request to Seek Prosecution of
German Comedian, POLITICO (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/angela-merkel-accepts-turkish-request-to-seek-prosecution-of-german-comediana6985686.html [https://perma.cc/9EK2-685X].
70. See Jan Böhmermann Erdogan Poem, VIMEO, https://vimeo.com/163537121
[https://perma.cc/6QPE-GEG3].
71. Konstantin Richter, Is Jan Böhmermann Funny?, POLITICO (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://www.politico.eu/article/is-jan-bohmermann-funny/ [https://perma.cc/4FRK-BLDS].
72. Id.
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The backlash to the “Böhmermann affair” was immediate and
sharp. 73 Many criticized Merkel for enacting prosecution, 74 while many
more questioned why a democratic country such as Germany could
have a law that criminalized insulting foreign leaders. 75 Eventually, the
Human Rights Watch even expressed its concern about the censorship
implications of Böhmermann’s arrest. 76
These critiques did not fall on deaf ears. Germany eventually
dropped the prosecution against Böhmermann. 77 That next year,
Germany’s parliament repealed the law, attempting to fix some of the
damage it had done. 78 There remained one troubling piece, however: a
civil law suit aimed at Böhmermann sought to prevent him from
repeating the poem. 79 The suit successfully barred him from repeating
all but six lines of the poem. 80
In international law, such measures must be considered. Silencing
of citizens must be considered a matter of public safety and
wellbeing. 81 Böhmermann’s arrest provides proof that Germany has
73. Justin Huggler, Merkel Faces Backlash After Collapse of Case Against German
Comedian for Insulting Erdogan, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2016/10/05/merkel-faces-backlash-after-collapse-of-case-against-german-come/
[https://perma.cc/8GXV-PFPQ].
74. Stefan Kuzmany, Merkel Falls Flat Over a Satirical Poem, SPEIGEL (Apr. 12, 2016),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-erdogan-affair-poses-serious-threat-tomerkel-power-a-1086813.html [https://perma.cc/878K-PTB4].
75. Lizzie Dearden, Erdogan Poem: Court bans German comedian Jan Böhmermann from
repeating controversial verses, INDEPENDENT (May 18, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/erdogan-poem-court-bans-german-comedian-jan-boehmermann-fromrepeating-sexual-verses-a7035896.html [https://perma.cc/BT3E-HUVY].
76. Germany: Prosecuting Satirists Mocks Freedom of Speech, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr.
16,
2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/16/germany-prosecuting-satirist-mocksfreedom-speech [https://perma.cc/7P4E-FQD4].
77. Associated Press, German Prosecutors Drop Probe of Comedian Over Insulting
Turkish President, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-germancomedian-dropped-investigation-20161004-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/R69C-JPAM].
78. Katie Forster, Germany abolishes law that bans insulting foreign leaders,
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germanylaw-insulting-foreign-leaders-erdogan-jan-boehmermann-comedian-sketch-outdated-lifts-bana7546341.html [https://perma.cc/4GAY-9YSJ].
79. Uri Friedman, The Thinnest Skinned President in the World, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/turkey-germany-erdoganbohmermann/479814/ [https://perma.cc/KYE6-WVVH].
80. Alison Smale, German Comedian Is Told Not to Repeat Lewd Lines About Erdogan,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/europe/janbohmermann-recep-tayyip-erdogan-poem.html [https://perma.cc/L3EC-6EWC].
81. JOHANN BAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
AND ITS (FIRST) OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 91 (Peter Lang GmbH ed., 2005).

1336 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

been non-compliant on its Article 19 duties, but the subsequent repeal
of the law and dismissal of the prosecution shows Germany as a
country committed, even if only for the public opinion, to compliance
with human rights law.
B. Article 19 and Its Limitations
Article 19 has given birth to confusing doctrine on freedom of
expression. 82 The freedom of expression doctrine is necessarily marred
by different values in different countries. As the European Court of
Justice (“ECJ”) noted extreme examples of differing speech values:
“Saudi Arabia does not allow criticism of its leadership nor questioning
of Islamic beliefs; Singapore bans speech that ‘denigrates Muslims and
Malays;’ and Thailand prohibits insults to the monarchy. Expression
supporting gay rights authored by a European writer for a European
audience violates the law in Russia.” 83 International law compensates
for differing values by providing flexibility to states to decide which
speech to regulate. 84
This is not to say that the HRC does not value freedom of
expression. 85 On the contrary, it is considered one of the most
fundamental rights to human beings. 86 This makes any inquiry into
freedom of expression complicated because it is simultaneously
incredibly important to defer to nation’s evaluations of speech while
also crucial to treat restrictions on valuable speech with scrutiny. 87
Article 19(2) reads: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers, either orally,
in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
his choice.” 88 Over the years, the HRC has interpreted Article 19(2) to
mean that Article 19(2) protects the liberal political ideals of freedom
of speech and expression. 89 The HRC also generally interprets Article

82. GISVOLD & CARLSON, supra note 46, at 119.
83. See Case C-507/17, CNIL v. Google ¶. 20.
84. Citron, supra note 18, at 1063.
85. Oster, supra note 62, at 40.
86. See id. at 40-41 (describing the value of freedom of expression in different democratic
countries).
87. Bair, supra note 81, at 91.
88. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 19(2).
89. Collins, supra note 52, at 389.
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19 to dictate that any limitation on speech or expression must be narrow
and justifiable. 90
In determining whether a law falls within the confines of Article
19, the Human Rights Committee has established a three-part
proportionality test. Under this framework, the HRC considers (1)
whether the interference was suitable to achieve the legitimate aim
pursued; 91 (2) whether the interference was the least intrusive
instrument among those which might achieve the legitimate aim; 92 and
(3) whether the interference was strictly proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. 93 The test is similar to the American Supreme Court’s
“strict scrutiny” test, albeit somewhat more lenient. 94
Article 19(3) acts as a natural limitation on Article 19(2). 95 Article
19(3) allows for restrictions on speech that violate the rights of others
or threaten national security or public order. 96 It also carves out
restrictions based on morality. 97 Thus, in order to deprive someone of
his or her right to free expression, a government must prove that one of
these factors is crucially at play. 98
A somewhat extreme illustration of Article 19(3)’s narrow
limitation is Alberto Grille Motta v. Uruguay. 99 In this case, Uruguay
arrested Motto for his connections to the communist party. 100 The
Uruguayan government was unable to provide evidence that Motto’s
political dissent was a threat to the public. 101 The International Court
90. Collins, supra note 52, at 389.
91. Oster, supra note 62, at 69.
92. Oster, supra note 62, at 69.
93. Oster, supra note 62, at 69; see also Human Rights Committee, Ballantyne and others
v. Canada [1993] Communication no. 359, 385/389 [11.4].
94. Despite Supreme Court protest, many legal scholars consider strict scrutiny “strict in
theory, but fatal in fact.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995).
95. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 19(3) (“The exercise of the rights provided for in [19(2)]
of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a)
For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) for the protection of national security or of
public order . . . or of public health or morals.”).
96. See ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 19(3). See also Bair, supra note 77, at 91.
97. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 19(3).
98. Bair, supra note 81, at 92 (stating limitations on free expression must “be shown as
necessary and proportionate to the goal in question and not arbitrary.”).
99. See Alberto Grille Motto v. Uruguay, Selected Decisions Under Optional Protocol, ¶¶
54-57,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/SelDec_1_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8AEX-4TY4].
100. Id. ¶ 16.
101. Id.
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of Justice found that subversive association allegations were not
sufficiently narrow to justify Motta’s arrest. 102
Article 20 is another limitation on Article 19. 103 Article 20 limits
hate speech or speech that incites violence. 104 Finally, Article 17
protects people from “unlawful attacks on [their] honor or
reputation.” 105 Countries in Europe tend to use dignity interests to
justify their laws limiting speech. 106 However, the ICCPR has been
interpreted by the HRC to be limited in this scope. 107 Predominantly,
limits on hate speech must truly only limit hate speech. 108 This is
problematic because there is no universal definition of hate speech, thus
there is no way for government to know exactly what may be
censored. 109
C. Freedom of Expression on the Internet
International bodies invested in human rights law have shown
particular interest in protecting free speech on the internet. 110 In fact,
102. Id.
103. Johann Bair, supra note 81, at 96.
104. See ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 20(2) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by
law. . . .”).
105. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 17(2). This Note primarily focuses on Article 19. Id. art.
19.
106. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Speech Without Borders: The Rise (And Risk) of Global
Censorship Online (2018) (on file with the author) (detailing an Austrian case where Facebook
was compelled to take down posts referring to a Green Party candidate for her dignity).
107. Bair, supra note 81, at 93-94.
108. Bair, supra note 81, at 93-94.
109. Roger Kiska, Hate Speech: A Comparison Between the European Court of Human
Rights and the United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 107, 111
(2013).
110. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Fifth Annual Report, General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/70/371 (Sept. 18, 2015) (by Ben Emmerson); Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Human Rights Council, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/29/32 (May 22, 2015) (by David Kaye); Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sept. 23, 2014) (by Ben Emmerson); Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013) (by Frank La Rue); Special Rapporteur on
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by Frank La Rue); Special Rapporteur on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 2009) (by Martin
Scheinin).
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there are many indicators that the HRC has taken affirmative steps to
prioritize free expression on the internet. On the other hand, European
human rights law has taken aims at protecting a different right on the
internet at any cost: dignity. This portion of this Note will observe the
different initiatives under both International and European Human
Rights law.
1. The HRC and Online Speech
The internet era presents unprecedented technology that has led to
unprecedented questions. 111 As far as it creates a novel ability to spread
information, many scholars equate the invention to that of the printing
press. 112 Like the printing press, the internet exponentially increased
the ease of information flow. 113 Now more than ever, people have the
entire wealth of knowledge of the world at their fingertips.114 The HRC
recognizes this, and has taken this new technology in stride. 115
Former Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank
La Rue, made it a priority to define the rights of Article 19 in particular
as crucial in defining Human Rights on the Internet. 116 In particular, he
released HRC General Comment Number 34, which was a mandate
creating an obligation on countries to protect the human being’s right
to the internet under Article 19 of the ICCPR. 117 The report was a firm
clarification of the need to protect the internet as a matter of human
rights: “facilitating access to the Internet for all individuals, with as
little restriction to online content as possible, should be a priority for
all States.” 118
The Special Rapporteur is deemed a “scholar,” or someone who
gathers information on behalf of the citizens of the world so that their

111. Kraski, supra note 23, at 924.
112. Collins, supra note 52, at 373.
113. Collins, supra note 52, at 373.
114. Collins, supra note 52, at 373.
115. Collins, supra note 52, at 373.
116. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by Frank La Rue).
117. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34 on Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion
and Expression, ¶15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sep. 12, 2011).
118. Id.
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rights may be enforced. 119 This is a history that dates back to the
formation of the Human Rights Council in 2006. 120 While there is not
an official mechanism of the Special Rapporteur to prosecute any
country, the word of the Special Rapporteur is seen to have some
authority on interpretations of human rights law. 121
In 2011, Special Rapporteur LaRue explicitly expanded Article
19 to include discourse over the internet. 122 He explicitly stated that the
Committee would have even more cause for concern for restrictions on
political speech, including the following language: “the mere fact that
forms of expression are considered to be insulting to a public figure is
not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties . . . .” 123
David Kaye further acknowledged the problematic role of Internet
Service Platforms in this process. 124 “Private intermediaries are
typically ill-equipped to make determinations of content
illegality . . . .” 125 The HRC disincentivizes legislation that forces
intermediaries to make arbitrary determinations about the illegality of
a post. 126
LaRue’s report acknowledges Article 19(3), but also emphasizes
its limited scope. 127 Despite the inconsistencies of past decisions
pertaining to Article 19(3), the HRC intends for the internet to remain
as free a place for expression as possible. 128
Paragraph 3 lays down specific conditions and it is only subject to
these conditions that restrictions may be imposed: the restrictions
must be “provided by law;” they may only be imposed for one of
the grounds set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3;
119. See HUGH THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 17
(1972). See also James D. Fry, Privacy, Predictability and Internet Surveillance in the U.S. and
China: Better the Devil You Know?, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 419, 431 (2015).
120. Ved P. Nanda, The Protection of Human Rights Under International Law: Will the
U.N. Human Rights Council and the Emerging New Norm “Responsibility to Protect” Make A
Difference?, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 353, 357 (2007); G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006).
121. See Donoho, supra note 34, at 18.
122. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34 on Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion
and Expression, ¶15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sep. 12, 2011).
123. Id.
124. Gabor Rona & Lauren Aarons, State Responsibility to Respect, Protect and Fulfill
Human Rights Obligations in Cyberspace, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 503, 509 (2016).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34, ¶¶ 12, 43.
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and they must conform to the strict tests of necessity and
proportionality . . . Restrictions must be applied only for those
purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly
related to the specific need on which they are predicated. 129
Scholars expanded upon LaRue’s imagining of Article 19. 130 For
example, Professor Molly Land tied LaRue’s report to a history of
Article 19. 131 She argues that the Framers of Article 19 meant for
expression through new technologies to be incorporated into the
right. 132 Her analysis concludes that there is no affirmative right to
provide the internet to citizens, but that Article 19 is triggered when
nations seek to deprive their citizens of access. 133
No item further articulates the commitment the HRC has to free
speech on the internet like the Declaration of freedom of expression,
released in March of 2017. 134 In the document, Special Rapporteur
David Kaye spoke explicitly of the dangers that Fake News could pose
to freedom of expression. 135 Indeed, the declaration explicitly states
that the HRC’s strong commitment to free speech on the internet was
directly preempting possible measures to stop fake news. 136
2. The European Union and the Right to be Forgotten
The European Union has notably taken a different approach to
human rights on the internet by prioritizing Data Privacy. 137 The
HRC’s primary response to concerns about the internet have been about
censorship, while Europe recently has gone to great lengths to protect
the “right to be forgotten.” 138
129. Id. at ¶ 22; see also Communication No. 1022/2001, Velichkin v. Belarus, Views
adopted on 20 October 2005, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1022/2001 (Oct. 20, 2005).
130. Oster, supra note 62, at 24.
131. See Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J.
393, 426 (2013).
132. Id.
133. See id. (“[A]lthough there may not be a right to access Twitter per se, a decision to
cut off access to Twitter would trigger the requirements of Article 19(3).”).
134. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression And “Fake News”, Disinformation and
Propaganda, FOM.GAL/3/17, available at https://www.osce.org/fom/302796?download=true
[https://perma.cc/KS99-PT7H] (official English version) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106
GEO. L.J. 115, 123 (2017).
138. Oster, supra note 62, at 54.
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The right to be forgotten found its roots in European notions of
dignity. 139 It is, at its core, a human rights response to the internet.140
In 2010, with the proliferation of online information, Viviane Reding
released a statement as European Commissioner for Justice,
Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship. 141 She stated that Europeans
would have control over what they posted online. 142 So duly named,
the right to be forgotten allows Europeans the luxury of controlling
their own image online against defaming content. 143 This right, as told
by Land, also falls under the protections of Article 19(2). 144
The right to be forgotten can come into direct conflict with
freedom of expression. 145 It necessarily means that any content posted
about another person is subject to the right. 146 Consider, for example,
Axel Springer AG v. Germany. 147 In Axel Springer, a television actor
had been arrested at a beer festival for possession of cocaine. 148 Axel
Springer published an article with details of the actor’s arrest. 149 The
actor sued for violations of his right to privacy and prevailed in the
German Courts. 150 The ECtHR found that Germany violated the
newspaper’s rights to free expression. 151
Axel Springer lays out the ultimate conflict between human rights
online. The actor has interest in keeping his dignity. The newspaper has
an interest in informing the public on matters of general interest. These
two human rights interests are in conflict in NetzDG as well. Germany
139. Id.
140. Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US
Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 161 (2012).
141. See Press Release, Building Trust in Europe’s Online Single Market, June 22, 2010,
(text of Reding speech), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/10/327 [https://perma.cc/T5BQ-AMAV]; see also Bennett, supra note 140,
at 161.
142. See Building Trust in Europe’s Online Single Market, supra note 141.
143. See Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to
Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 1046 (2018).
144. Land, supra note 131, at, 432.
145. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that America
does not recognize a right to be forgotten, and emphasizing free speech as the right at stake).
146. Oster, supra note 62, at 73.
147. Axel Springer Ag v. Germany, (Application no. 39954/08) [2012] App. No. 39954/08
[89-95], https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CASEOF-AXEL-SPRINGER-AG-v.-GERMANY.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DD3-SYWR] [hereinafter
Axel Springer].
148. Id.at ¶ 11.
149. Id. at ¶ 13.
150. Id. at ¶ 20.
151. Id. at ¶ 70.
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wants to protect the rights of those even more vulnerable members of
society than a well-known actor, at the expense of speech that is
arguably less valuable than a factual report on an embarrassing arrest.
Despite protecting the actor in Axel Springer, Europe has worked
tirelessly to protect dignity online. 152 In 2016, the European Union
enacted the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), and it went
into force May of 2018. 153 In doing so, Europe codified the right to be
forgotten, and compelled internet platforms to delete millions of posts
and websites. 154 In 2017, the European courts dealt with Google which
fought the compelled deletions under speech law. 155 The ECJ held that
the GDPR created an obligation for Google to hide or remove content
from millions of users through the continent. 156 Google now must
protect the rights of millions of internet users to erase themselves from
the internet. 157
3. American Free Speech and Internet Jurisprudence
America has a famously robust conception of free speech. While
the first right protected in the German Basic Law is human dignity, the
First Amendment of the Bill of Rights protects the freedom to speak.158
When the right to speak is implicated in any state action, any restriction
on said right is held to the highest level of scrutiny. 159 The restriction
must be narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest.160
Over the last few decades, this right has expanded to the protections of
many different forms of speech. Specifically, the Supreme Court seeks
to protect political speech. Primarily, free speech doctrine holds that
152. See Daskal, supra note 102, at 63.
153. See Post, supra note 143, at 987.
154. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L119), art. 17 [hereinafter GDPR].
155. See Post, supra note 143, at 997.
156. Id.
157. Aliya Ram, Google Receives 2.4m Requests to Delete Search Results, IRISH TIMES
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/google-receives-2-4mrequests-to-delete-search-results-1.3407979 [https://perma.cc/2SSS-5S7B]. This is not to say
the European Union does not care for Free Speech. In CNIL v. Google, the ECJ makes a
concerted effort to balance expression and speech, favoring speech. See infra notes 364-68.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press. . . .”).
159. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (“Because the Act
imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless [the government]
can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny.”).
160. If the speech is not protected by the First Amendment, it is subject to rational basis
review, which is the Court’s most deferential standard of review. See San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).

1344 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

the speaker has the right to determine his or her own speech content.161
American law also protect speech the most when it is a “public
issue.” 162
American free speech jurisprudence also does not discriminate as
to the content of the speech. 163 To do so is considered “viewpoint
discrimination. 164 Justice Brennan referred to viewpoint discrimination
as “censorship in its purest form” and warned that “government
regulation that discriminates among viewpoints threatens the continued
vitality of ‘free speech.’” 165 It is in this standard that the United States
takes the largest departure from European laws on speech.
Like the HRC, the Supreme Court in the United States has
attached free speech heavily to the Internet. As with all Constitutional
rights in America, only public actors are bound by the First
Amendment. 166 This means that social media providers, as private
companies, have the rights to restrict content on their platforms. That
is not to say that the Supreme Court has been silent on the issues of
speech on the Internet. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has touched
Internet speech a few times since its inception.
One of the earlier examples is Reno v. ACLU. 167 The Court struck
down portions of the CDA that Congress had aimed at protecting
minors from pornography. 168 Although Justice Stevens did not hold
that the Internet is subject to any specific Internet-only protections, he
describes it as “diverse as human thought.” 169 He then summarizes that
the Court’s precedent “provide[s] no basis for qualifying the level of
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.”170
In 2014, a court in the Southern District of New York gave a search
161. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/content Neutral and
Content/viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 635 n.28 (2003).
162. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011).
163. Jacobs, supra note 154, at 599.
164. Maura Douglas, Finding Viewpoint Neutrality in Our Constitutional Constellation,
20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 727, 730 (2018).
165. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
166. Sharp Corp. v. Hisense USA Corp., 292 F. Supp. 3d 157, 175 (D.D.C. 2017), (“It is
axiomatic that to elicit First Amendment protection, the infringement upon speech or petition
rights must have arisen from state action of some kind.”), dismissed, No. 17-7158, 2017 WL
9401061 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 26, 2017).
167. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
168. Id. at 859.
169. Id. at 870.
170. Id.
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engine free speech rights in its search results in Baidu. 171 The court
held that an Internet service provider has a free speech interest in its
ability to filter search results, as an editor of the content. 172
Recently, in Packingham v. North Carolina, Justice Kennedy
referred to the Internet as today’s public forum for ideas. 173 The
Supreme Court has not expressly held that Internet speech has more
protection than any other speech, but the language in Packingham
indicates that the Court hopes to keep speech on the Internet as
unregulated as possible. 174 This approach could lead to dangerous
consequences. Justice Alito alludes to the consequences of the Court’s
“undisciplined dicta” in his dissent. 175
4. Comparing European, International, and United States Internet
Speech Policy
The difference in priority between the European and International
Law speaks to Germany’s conception of its duty to regulate the
Internet. Germany seems to have aligned with the European conception
of what to protect online, because the stated purpose of NetzDG is to
protect against hate speech and fake news. 176 However, as the
international body designated to speak on human rights norms, the
HRC has prioritized the prevention of censorship. 177 As the Internet
continues to change the world in which we live, it is important to

171. Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
172. Id. Interestingly, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act specifically
shields internet platforms for liability on their sites because they are not publishers. Thus,
Internet companies have all the protections and none of the liability of publishers.
173. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). (“Social media allows
users to gain access to information and communicate with one another about it on any subject
that might come to mind . . . North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what for many
are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking
and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human
thought and knowledge.”).
174. Brian P. Kane, Social Media Is the New Town Square: The Difficulty in Blocking
Access to Public Official Accounts, 60 ADVOC. 31, 32 (2017).
175. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (Alito, J., dissenting).
176. Linda Kinstler, Germany’s Attempt to Fix Facebook is Backfiring, ATLANTIC (May
18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/germany-facebook-afd/
560435/ [https://perma.cc/JM65-69CB]; Bernand Rohleder, Germany Set Out to Delete Hate
Speech Online. Instead, It Only Made Things Worse, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/20/netzdg/?utm_term=.58bb
3a6fb06d [https://perma.cc/6J5N-JZFN].
177. Joint Declaration, supra note 129.
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understand that both rights are implicated when discussing restrictions
on internet platforms.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF NETZDG AND GERMAN HATE SPEECH
LAW
Germany claims that their law is narrowly tailored as to only
prosecute hate speech, and that in the process they are promoting
important human rights aims. 178 Part III of this Note will explore
Germany’s law pertaining to speech. 179 Section III.A will evaluate the
historical context for Germany’s hate speech law. 180 Section III.B will
evaluate NetzDG itself as connected to this history. 181 Section III.C will
observe Germany’s justification for the law. 182
A. Inviolable Dignity
NetzDG is written to capture the proliferation of hate speech and
fake news online. 183 The prohibition of hate speech is consistent with
Germany’s past laws on expression. 184 Germany’s hate speech law
derives both from ancient laws protecting “honor” and “social status”
and laws enacted after World War II for comprehensive protection of
minorities. 185 The result is one of the most heavily regulated arenas for
speech amongst democratic nations. 186
Germany, like the United States, protects the right of their people
to speak freely and to be “free from censorship.” 187 Germany protects
this right in Article 5 of their Constitution. 188 However, unlike its First
178. German Government response to the Special Rapporteur, 8/2017,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/GermanyReply9Aug2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QF6X-4X6F] [hereinafter German Kaye Response].
179. See infra Part III.
180. See infra Section III.A.
181. See infra Section III.B.
182. See infra Section III.C.
183. See NetzDG, supra note 7.
184. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], as amended Dec. 31, 2007 (trans. by
Michael Bohlander) (Ger.); Deborah Levine, Note, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But
Words May Also Hurt Me: A Comparison of United States and German Hate Speech Laws, 41
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1293, 1318 (2018).
185. Levine, supra note 184.
186. Fleming Rose, Germany’s Attack on Free Speech, CATO INST. (May 30, 2017),
https://www.cato.org/blog/germanys-attack-free-speech [https://perma.cc/A6GE-2E6N].
187. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB5D-4CWQ].
188. Id.
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Amendment counterpart, Article 5 contains express carve outs for hate
speech. 189 While American jurisprudence treats hate speech with strict
scrutiny, Germany sees hate speech as a phenomenon that should
receive no legal protection. 190
Germany’s constitution highlights the oft cited European right to
“dignity,” 191 which comes into contact with speech online quite a bit.192
The highest Constitutional Courts in Germany have deemed human
dignity to be the center of all basic rights in Germany. It is Article 1 in
their Basic Law. 193
This right diverges from the American right to privacy
somewhat. 194 James Whitman argues that this discrepancy reaches to
the core of what each culture tries to protect. 195 In continental Europe,
matters of privacy and dignity are about the protection of one’s name,
image, and reputation. 196 In America, privacy is about freedom from
government surveillance. 197 These distinctions become clear in the
different continental approaches towards privacy protection. For
example, in America there is emphasis on the need for a warrant before
the government may search your home. 198 On the other hand,

189. Ryan Kraski, supra note 23, at 930–31 (2017) (“These rights shall find their limits in
the provisions of general laws . . . and in the right to personal honor.”).
190. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB5D-4CWQ].
191. Jennifer Daskal, supra note 102.
192. Jennifer Daskal, supra note 102.
193. DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 355 (2012) (“[T]his provision
expresses the highest value of the Basic Law, informing the substance and spirit of the entire
document.”). The authors also note that the clause on human dignity has served a similar purpose
in German constitutional law that the Due Process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments have served in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. Id.
194. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004).
195. Id. at 1160 (“At least as far as the law goes, we do not seem to possess general
‘human’ intuitions about the ‘horror’ of privacy violations. We possess something more
complicated than that: We possess American intuitions—or, as the case may be, Dutch, Italian,
French, or German intuitions.”).
196. Id. at 1161.
197. Id. at 1161-62 (“[T]he prime danger, from the American point of view, is that the
‘sanctity of [our] home[s]’ . . . American anxieties thus focus comparatively little on the media.
Instead, they tend to be anxieties about maintaining a kind of private sovereignty within our own
walls.”).
198. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (holding that a warrant is necessary
to prevent unreasonable searches by officers who abuse the power of the law).
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Europeans are far more accepting of government interference, 199 but
far less tolerant of defaming someone and ruining their lives. 200
The internet endangers both rights to privacy, and both continental
Europe and America have sought to protect those rights. In 2018 in
Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the
government would need a warrant to access cell site data, effectively
ruling that in the new age of the internet, privacy needed heightened
protection from government forces. 201 The Court acknowledged that
as digital technology expanded, our notions of it was important to
protect citizens from government surveillance. 202 Given the amount of
data that internet platforms accumulate, allowing the government
unencumbered access to that data would give the government the
ability to track all citizens at any given point. 203
The right to one’s control over one’s personal image is a
recognized right throughout Europe, and subtly diverges from the right
to privacy. 204 NetzDG can promote this goal for the large portion of
private citizens affected by online harassment, many who are not public
figures and should be legally protected from a large amount of online
hate speech and defamation.
Germany’s law on free speech is particularly tied to the ethics of
the speech itself. 205 Lüth was the pivotal case on Germany’s freedom
of expression. 206 Harlan, a Nazi propagandist filmmaker, escaped the
mass of criminal penalty that followed World War II. 207 He made an
effort after the war to recreate a career for himself. 208 Luth, appalled by
Harlan’s reemergence in decent society, organized a boycott of the
film. 209 Harlan sued Luth for an injunction against the boycott. 210 After
initially losing at the trial level and on appeal, Lüth appealed to the
199. See Whitman, supra note 194, at 1216 (describing European laws where a
government has control over ability to name a baby).
200. Id. at 1155-56.
201. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
202. Id.
203. Id. (“The Government's position fails to contend with the seismic shifts in digital
technology that made possible the tracking of not only Carpenter's location but also everyone
else's, not for a short period but for years and years.”).
204. Whitman, supra note 194, at 1161.
205. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 441.
206. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 442.
207. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 442.
208. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 442.
209. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 442.
210. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 443.

2019]

NUTZ ABOUT NETZ

1349

Federal Constitutional Court, claiming that his rights to free speech
under Article 5 had been violated. 211 The court held in favor of Lüth,
holding that Constitutional decisions did not exist in a vacuum. 212 They
found Luth’s good faith effort to prevent a Nazi from reemerging in the
public eye outweighed any claim Harlan had to his future career. 213
The court took a decidedly less sympathetic stance towards a
political boycott in Blinkfüer. 214 Blinkfüer, a small, pro-communist
newspaper, sought distribution of their writing throughout shops in
Germany. 215 A far larger newspaper, Axel Springer, essentially
blacklisted Blinkfüer by threatening to pull its products from many
stores carrying the smaller magazine. 216 In the Blinkfüer decision, the
court waxed poetic about the importance of intellectual debate in
democracy. 217 The court even went so far as to distinguish the case and
hand from Lüth: “Lüth’s call for a boycott was simply an appeal to the
moral and political responsibility of his audience . . . .” 218 A movement
against Nazis was more protected in the court’s eye than a movement
against communist views. The discrepancy between these two cases
show Germany’s perception of speech is inextricably tied to the
morality of the speech itself.
Lüth particularly exhibits Germany’s more cherry-picked view on
free speech. Unlike in the United States, where the court system holds
fast that speech cannot be judged by its substance, 219 German courts
allow for judgments about the content of the material when it comes to
unsavory material. 220 Another particularly crude example would be a
lawsuit in which a politician protested comments made about him.221
Those comments compared him to a “rutting pig,” and were sexual in
211. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 443.
212. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 444 (“[The] Basic Law is not a value neutral
document . . . the content of the existing law must also be brought into harmony with this system
of values.”).
213. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 448.
214. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 454.
215. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 454-55.
216. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 454-55
217. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 456 (“[T]he freedom of intellectual debate
is an absolute prerequisite for the functioning of a free democracy. . . .”).
218. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 456
219. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995) (“The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”).
220. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 462.
221. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 462.
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nature. 222 The German court held that the politician’s dignity
considerations outweighed the importance of expressing opinions
about him. 223
Germany’s laws show a country that prioritizes the morality of the
speech it censors far more than other countries. The ICCPR provides
for such hate speech and dignity considerations. 224 As NetzDG is a bill
targeted directly at content like a “rutting pig” comment, this context is
important in understanding why and how Germany enacted NetzDG.
Germany has staunchly defended NetzDG against multiple
international attacks by arguing that NetzDG is a protection of German
civil rights. 225 The German government was forced to grapple with the
repercussions of this legislation when the Special Rapporteur published
his letter. 226 Germany’s reply shows its commitment to the measure to
prevent hate speech online by pointing out (1) the narrowing tactics it
used revising the bill; (2) the relevance of the law to problems today;
and (3) the already present obligation on social media sites to remove
criminal content. 227
Germany’s language in support of its bill to the Human Rights
Watch shows their commitment to the idea that NetzDG protects the
dignity of its citizens. 228 It goes on to criticize social media companies
for being slow to react to the pressing issues of online criminal
activity. 229 These legitimate concerns have plagued governments and
scholars alike, and Germany’s efforts to combat these problems are
amongst the most extreme responses.

222. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 462.
223. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 464.
224. See infra Part III.
225. See Tough new German law puts tech firms and free speech in Spotlight, IRISH TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2018, https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/tough-new-german-law-putstech-firms-and-free-speech-in-spotlight-1.3346155 [https://perma.cc/7ZP8-62AZ] (quoting
Justice minister Heiko Mas saying, “Incitement to murder, threats, insults and incitement of the
masses or Auschwitz lies are not an expression of freedom of opinion but rather attacks on the
freedom of opinion of others.”).
226. See generally Kaye Letter, supra note 19.
227. German Kaye Response, supra note 20.
228. German Kaye Response, supra note 20 (“In 2015, the increasing spread of hate crime
on the internet (especially on social networks such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter) became
ever more serious. Not only hate speech, defamation and malicious gossip were an issue but also
the spread of ‘fake news.’”).
229. German Kaye Response, supra note 20.
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B. NetzDG Itself
1. The Text
NetzDG operates to criminally penalize social media operators for
the content on their websites. 230 The law targets social media in
particular, as opposed to other internet platforms. 231 Specifically, it
seeks to hinder social media giants. 232 It specifically seeks to remove
slanderous and hateful speech in violation of German law. 233 The law
gives a window of roughly seven days after the post is reported for
social media providers to decide whether or not a post is in violation of
NetzDG, and then subsequently to remove it. 234 However, if the post is
“manifestly unlawful,” 235 then media providers have twenty-four hours
to remove the content. 236 The bill makes no attempt to define exactly
what “manifestly unlawful” means. 237 NetzDG does cite twenty-one
different criminal statutes, 238 but it makes no attempt to differentiate
between them. 239 For example, the bill does not specify if there is any
more urgency to removing content propagating terrorist groups that
content insulting another person. Such key nuances would help social
media companies and the German public understand which content
should be prioritized.

230. NetzDG, supra note 7.
231. NetzDG, supra note 7. The bill targets websites that “for profit-making purposes,
operate internet platforms which are designed to enable users to share any content with other
users or to make such content available to the public. . . .” NetzDG, supra note 7. The legislation
also specifically carves out “[p]latforms offering journalistic or editorial content . . . [and]
platforms which are designed to enable individual communication or the dissemination of
specific content.” Id. As a result, sites like Facebook and Youtube are held liable, but not
LinkedIn or Whatsapp.
232. The bill, for example, only requires social media websites who receive more than 100
complaints per year to report their deletions to the government. See German Kaye Response,
supra note 20, at 2 (“The obligation to report . . . only applies to platform operators who receive
more than 100 complaints per year. . . .”).
233. The bill references several other sections of the German criminal code. They pertain
to, among other things, dissemination of propaganda for an illegal political party, treasonous
forgery, incitement of hatred, and defamation. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE],
as amended Dec. 31, 2007 (trans. by Michael Bohlander) (Ger.).
234. NetzDG, supra note 7.
235. NetzDG, supra note 7. It should be noted that the original German words have been
translated in several different forms, including, “obviously illegal.”
236. NetzDG, supra note 7.
237. See generally NetzDG, supra note 7.
238. NetzDG, supra note 7, art. 1, § 1.3.
239. NetzDG, supra note 7, art. 1, § 1.3.
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NetzDG carries heavy penalties for failure to comply. 240 They can
reach up to EU€5 million. 241 Scholars speculate that resulting fines
could be multiplied to up to even EU€57 million. 242 NetzDG also
includes a reporting requirement. 243 Every six months, social media
providers must submit detailed, public reports on all of the deleted
content from the last six months. 244
Noticeably lacking in NetzDG is a mechanism for users to
challenge platforms’ decisions to remove their content. 245 The law
explicitly carves out a mechanism for administrative bodies to review
social media platforms’ decisions, but no formal mechanism is in place
for lawful content that has been removed. 246 Notably, the users who
posted the removed materials are not given any way to defend their
content.
2. Enforcement
The news cycle is fast moving, and there is no simple way for
internet platforms to keep up with the number of hateful comments that
arise in twenty-four hours without censorship. 247 In their six-month
reports, social media providers overwhelmingly say they have seen
small numbers of complaints, each site stating it is deleting between
twenty percent and twenty-five percent of reported content. 248 By the
standards of the German government, it would seem that these
platforms are doing a careful job monitoring their sites for violations
of free speech. 249

240. NetzDG, supra note 7, art. 4, § 2.
241. NetzDG, supra note 7, art. 4, § 2.
242. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 18, at 1049.
243. NetzDG supra note 7, art. 1, § 2.
244. NetzDG supra note 7, art. 1, § 2.
245. See NetzDG supra note 7, art. 1, § 2.
246. Kaye Response, supra note 19.
247. See Citron, supra note 18, at 1055 (noting that the expenses of content review may
push internet platforms towards a “presumption of deletion”).
248. NetzDG
Transparency
Report,
FACEBOOK,
https://fbnewsroomus.files.
wordpress.com/2018/07/facebook_netzdg_july_2018_english-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T4RWHXE]; NetzDG Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google.com/
netzdg/youtube [https://perma.cc/8VQA-WW9A]; NetzDG Transparency Statistics, TWITTER,
https://transparency.twitter.com/en/countries/de.html [https://perma.cc/XF43-HZYJ].
249. Lucina Southern, “Before, It Was A Black Box’’: Platforms Report How They Delete
Illegal Content in Germany, DIGIDAY (Aug. 2, 2018), https://digiday.com/media/black-boxplatforms-report-delete-illegal-content-germany/ [https://perma.cc/6CMC-RP77].
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These numbers tell an incomplete story because they do not
account for the number of posts deleted before reporting. 250 A recent
report documents that from January to June of 2018, Facebook
removed over two and a half million posts for “violating community
standards.” 251 A sixth of Facebook’s global moderation team is
committed to the practice, working in what are known as “deletion
centers.” 252 This means Facebook has been removing approximately
14,000 posts per day since NetzDG went into enforcement. While there
is not enough transparency to determine how many deletions were
German deletions, Facebook has confirmed that this number is a direct
result of “paying attention to the German law.” 253
Thus far, there is little adjudication on the issue, but one example
shows that courts are amenable to the nuance of the German law.254
Recently, a poster won a victory against Facebook over a deleted
comment. 255 The Facebook user had posted a newspaper article about
Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban’s comments on immigrants.256
The user added his own view that Germans were being “stupid” about
immigrants and were brainwashed by the media. 257 Facebook removed

250. Id.
251. Douglas Busvine, Facebook Deletes Hundreds of Posts Under German Hate Speech
Law, REUTERS (July 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-germany/
facebook-deletes-hundreds-of-posts-under-german-hate-speech-law-idUSKBN1KH21L
[https://perma.cc/4JY2-HDG8].
252. Phillip Oltermann, Tough New German Law Puts Tech Firms and Free Speech in
Spotlight, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/05/
tough-new-german-law-puts-tech-firms-and-free-speech-in-spotlight [https://perma.cc/A9M6PBJ2].
253. Id.
254. Christof Kerman & Johannes Steger, German Court Overturns Facebook
‘Censorship’, HANDLESBLATT GLOBAL (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/
politics/free-speech-german-court-overturns-facebook-censorship/23581834.html
[https://perma.cc/3GZM-AS2Z]: Peter Muehlbauer, Interim Injunction: Facebook May Neither
Delete Nor Suspend Legal Comment, TELEPOLIS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.heise.de/tp/
features/Einstweilige-Verfuegung-Facebook-darf-legalen-Kommentar-weder-loeschen-nochsperren-4022958.html [https://perma.cc/YU29-K6YG]; David Meyer, Court Tells Facebook:
Stop Deleting ‘Offensive’ Comments, ZDNET (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/
court-tells-facebook-stop-deleting-offensive-comment/ [https://perma.cc/UPW9-J3WJ].
255. Kerman & Steger, supra note 254; Muehlbauer, supra note 254; Meyer, supra note
254.
256. Kerman & Steger, supra note 254; Muehlbauer, supra note 254; Meyer, supra note
254.
257. Kerman & Steger, supra note 254; Muehlbauer, supra note 254; Meyer, supra note
254.
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the post and blocked the user. 258 The documentation of the case
(including the identity of the Facebook user) remains confidential, but
the German court granted a temporary injunction against Facebook,
reinstating the user’s account. 259 The court cited German freedom of
expression rights as the reason for reinstating the post. 260 The victory,
though one in a sea of uncertainty, may provide a window to the power
of an enforcement mechanism on the law. 261
IV. NETZDG AS A PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
In order to determine whether or not NetzDG is in violation of
Article 19, it is important to weigh the proportionality of the
legislation. 262 Part III of this Note evaluates Germany’s legitimate aim
with this legislation, 263 and detail the consequences of the legislation
being too broad. 264 It will evaluate whether the consequences of this
legislation outweigh the legitimate concerns of the German
government. 265
A. Germany’s Legitimate Aim
1. Loss of Dignity Online
The core of NetzDG is based on the right to one’s own dignity and
honor. 266 The right to control one’s personal image is a recognized right
throughout Europe, and subtly diverges from the right to privacy.267
NetzDG can promote this goal for the large portion of private citizens
affected by online harassment, many of whom are not public figures
and should be legally protected from a large amount of online hate
speech and defamation.

254.
254.
254.
254.

258. Kerman & Steger, supra note 254; Muehlbauer, supra note 254; Meyer, supra note
259. Kerman & Steger, supra note 254; Muehlbauer, supra note 254; Meyer, supra note
260. Kerman & Steger, supra note 254; Muehlbauer, supra note 254; Meyer, supra note
261. Kerman & Steger, supra note 254; Muehlbauer, supra note 254; Meyer, supra note
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
Whitman, supra note 194, at 1161.
Whitman, supra note 194, at 1162.
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Indeed, under-regulation of the internet has disastrous
consequences, as one can see in the United States, a country that does
not recognize dignity as a right. 268 Internet platforms enjoy immunity
in the United States for the content posted to their sites. 269 Because of
this immunity, anonymous posters may get away with rampant
mistreatment. 270 The individual harassment of people online can be
emotionally devastating and can lead to severe, and sometimes instant,
consequences. 271
Beyond the personal consequences of unregulated vitriol online,
there are broad sweeping consequences for the rise of political groups
voicing hate speech online. 272 Recently in America, there have been
instances of domestic terrorism that stem directly from online
instigation. 273 For example, in October of 2018 a man walked into a
synagogue in Pennsylvania and executed the deadliest attack on Jewish
people in American history. 274 The evidence suggests that he was riled
up by online anti-Semitism. 275
268. Whitman, supra note 194, at 1193.
269. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West).
270. See, e.g., DANIELLE CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) (articulating the
protections that revenge porn sites have under section 230) [hereinafter Hate Crimes].
271. See, e.g., id. (detailing a woman’s experience of being plagued by online mobs and
her struggles to find employment); Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide, THE NEW YORKER (Feb.
6
2012,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/02/06/the-story-of-a-suicide
[https://perma.cc/4R65-88HD] (describing a young man’s suicide after his roommate secretly
recorded him having sex with a man and published the video).
272. See, e.g., Pamela A. Maclean, Google Resists Becoming Digital ‘Town Square’ in
Censorship Spat, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-03-15/google-resists-becoming-digital-town-square-in-censorship-spat
[https://perma.cc/TYC9-RMDW] (“Silicon Valley’s social media giants are under attack from
both the left and the right for not doing enough to police hate speech, terrorist propaganda and
Russian election meddling.”).
273. See, e.g., Deanna Paul & Kellie Gormly, An attack on a tight-knit Jewish community
has
left
it
shellshocked,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Oct.
27,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/10/27/close-knit-community-squirrel-hillshock-confusion/?utm_term=.4d4995c27062 [https://perma.cc/U5DP-K8J8].
274. Campbell Robertson, Christopher Mele & Sabrina Tavernise, 11 Killed in Synagogue
Massacre; Suspect Charged With 29 Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/us/active-shooter-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting.html
[https://perma.cc/93EA-XNVM].
275. See Saeed Ahmend & Paul P. Murphy, Here’s What We Know So Far About Robert
Bowers, The Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting Suspect, CNN (Oct. 28, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/27/us/synagogue-attack-suspect-robert-bowersprofile/index.html [https://perma.cc/9FKM-BJD9]; Renatta Signorini & Natasha Lindstrom,
Suspected Squirrel Hill Synagogue Gunman: ‘Jews are the Children of Satan,’ TRIBLIVE (Oct.
27, 2018), https://triblive.com/local/allegheny/14220087-74/alleged-synagogue-shooter-jewsare-the-children-of-satan [https://perma.cc/5BQG-9BZG].
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Further, the evermore complicated question arises: what to do
about “fake news.” 276 Fake news rocked the world in 2016 when both
the United Kingdom and the United States fell prey to mass
disinformation attacks. 277 After thorough investigation, it became clear
that Russia had targeted both countries, primarily through Facebook, in
pivotal elections, possibly altering the results. 278
These examples would all present violations of human dignity
under German law. 279 Defaming content is at the heart of German
constitutional jurisprudence, so the vicious online attacks are definitely
in violation of those laws. 280 Further, the First Amendment may be the
central protection under American law, 281 but protection against hate
would be of utmost importance to protect against in German law.282
Even fake news would be in violation. NetzDG claims a reach-around
sort of protection against fake news, and thus protects against fake
news aimed at harming minorities. 283 Given that human dignity rights
protect a person’s ability to protect his or her image, the dissemination
276. Ashley Smith-Roberts, Facebook, Fake News, and the First Amendment, 95 DENV.
L. REV. ONLINE 118, 119-20 (2018). “Fake news” is now commonly used to refer to the
proliferation of misinformation on the internet. Fake news has more of an ability to spread and
seem convincing because the internet algorithms prioritize “popular” posts, as opposed to well
researched ones. See James Carson, What Exactly Is Fake News, And How Can You Spot It?,
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/fake-news-exactly-hasreally-had-influence/ [https://perma.cc/M2GY-8GQA].
277. Smith-Roberts, supra note 276, at 119.
278. See Smith-Roberts, supra note 276, at 119.
279. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment:
Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity As A Preferred Constitutional
Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1584 (2004). These would also violate several sections
of Germany’s criminal code. The German Penal Code (as amended Dec. 19, 2001) (trans.
Stephen Thaman, 2002).
280. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 355.
281. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[A]ny
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could
from any soapbox . . . the same individual can become a pamphleteer . . . ‘the content on the
Internet is as diverse as human thought.’”).
282. Basic Law art. 1(1) (“Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the
duty of all state authority.”); See also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective
on the First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity As A
Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1553 (2004) (“[F]ree speech
simply is not the most important constitutional value in the German legal order; instead, pursuant
to the first clause of the Basic Law, human dignity holds this position”).
283. See Questions and Answers on the Network Enforcement Act, BUNDESMINISTERIUM
DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/FAQ/EN/
NetzDG/NetzDG.html [https://perma.cc/84J4-85CW] (where Germany claims the law combats
fake news). It is worth noting that there are no provisions of NetzDG that expressly combat fake
news. See generally NetzDG, supra note 7.
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of inaccurate news about minority groups implicates human dignity
rights. 284 To this extent, NetzDG is permissible as a protection of
human rights. 285
2. Terrorism Recruitment Online
The European Union, the United States, and several other
countries have struggled to deal with terrorists’ use of the internet for
recruitment purposes and dissemination of violent content.286
Terrorism recruitment became a large problem online well before
NetzDG was enacted. 287 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”),
for example, has been using social media to globally recruit for almost
a decade. In 2015, the Brooking Institute estimated that ISIS supporters
used somewhere between 46,000 and 70,000 twitter accounts in the last
three months of 2014. 288 In 2018, Rukmini Callimachi, the journalist
who dedicates her life to covering ISIS, noted that there are more
terrorists in Iraq and Syria alone right now than there were worldwide
on the eve of 9/11. 289
The evidence suggests that internet companies, for years, were
negligent in tracking terrorism on their platforms. 290 For example,
when Tashmin Malik posted about her allegiance with ISIS in 2014,
Facebook removed the post but did not alert the authorities. 291 Soon
after, Malik killed fourteen people in San Bernadino, California.292
Facebook is even one of the few social media sites proactively
removing terrorism from their platform in the United States. 293

284. See Kraski, supra note 23, at 938 (claiming that insult law would be the best way to
combat fake news online).
285. Oster, supra note 62, at 93.
286. Citron, supra note 18, at 1042.
287. Flemming Rose participates in the panel, “Panel: Fake news and free speech,”
hosted by the Alliance of Democracies, CATO INST. (June 22, 2018), https://www.cato.org/
multimedia/media-highlights-tv/flemming-rose-participates-panel-panel-fake-news-freespeech-hosted [https://perma.cc/Y5KT-N2HW].
288. J.M. BERGER & JONATHAN MORGAN, THE ISIS TWITTER CENSUS: DEFINING AND
DESCRIBING THE POPULATION OF ISIS SUPPORTERS ON TWITTER (2015).
289. Caliphate: Chapter One: The Reporter, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018) (downloaded
using iTunes).
290. Susan Klein & Crystal Flinn, Social Media Compliance Programs and the War
Against Terrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 53, 56 (2017).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 72.
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Laws like NetzDG incentivize platforms to shut down online
terrorism immediately. 294 The companies must track an illegal content
on their platforms, including propagating hate groups. 295 Because of
this requirement, hate groups have no way of congregating online in
Germany, nor can one read posts from ISIS within German borders.296
Thus, NetzDG would protect Germany from online radicalization that
plagues other countries.
B. The Problems of Proportionality
1. Facebook and Twitter: Public Actors
Social media platforms yield the majority of the control over
which content gets deleted as “hate speech” and which content is
allowed to remain. 297 Traditionally, internet companies tend to
subscribe to the most radical definitions of free speech. 298 At the start,
the internet pioneers considered their new toy a wild west of speech.299
John Parry Barlow, one of the original internet crusaders, even went so
far as to establish an Internet Declaration of Independence. 300 Still
today, many Silicon Valley techies believe they are the true arbiters of
the market of information. 301

294. Alexander Tsesis, Foreword: Terrorist Incitement on the Internet, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 367, 368 (2017).
295. NetzDG supra note 7, at § 1.3.
296. NetzDG supra note 7, at § 1.3. (“Unlawful content shall be content within the
meaning of subsection . . . which fulfils the requirements of the offences described in sections
86, 86a, 89a, 91, 100a, 111, 126, 129 to 129b, 130, 131, 140, 166, 184b in connection with 184d,
185 to 187, 241 or 269 of the Criminal Code and which is not justified.”).
297. VIDUSHI MARDA ET AL., WISDOM OF THE CROWD: MULTISTAKEHOLDER
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FAKE NEWS DEBATE (Internet Policy Observatory at the Annenberg
School for Communication, Univ. Penn, eds., 2018). See also Kate Klonick, The New
Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV.
1598, 1608 (2018).
298. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? (Oxford University
Press, Inc.) (2006).
299. Id. at 16.
300. Id. at 20 (citing John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace, http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html [https://perma.cc/GVC8DBN8]).
301. See Ashley Smith-Roberts, Facebook, Fake News, and the First Amendment, 95
DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 124–25 (2018) (“Twitter has declared itself to be the ‘free speech
wing of the free speech party;’ Facebooks says it is ‘in the business of letting people share stuff
they are interested in;’ and Reddit promotes itself as a ‘free speech site with very few
exceptions.’”)
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This changed in the midst of scandals and pressure from
regulators (particularly European ones) to reform. 302 Internet
companies suddenly found themselves in the midst of new and decisive
regulations (NetzDG amongst them). 303 As a result, many high-profile
platforms have publicly committed to enhancing their moderation of
content. 304
This present large problems in the context of human rights law for
several reasons: (1) there is little transparency to which content gets
deleted and why; and (2) because NetzDG’s definitions are so vague,
social media platforms must make the decisions themselves as to which
content gets deleted. 305
The HRC is highly deferential to moral differences amongst
nation states. 306 NetzDG, however, presents a novel problem of
international internet law; it is not the German government, but the
intermediaries, that are making the decisions of what can be deleted.307
NetzDG does not give social media platforms a clear picture of which
content violates German law. As a result, social media providers are
the ones making the value judgments on what to delete from their
deletion centers. The intermediaries are some of the most powerful
actors in the world of information today, governmental or private. 308
2. The Chilling of Political Speech
NetzDG has a chilling effect on political speech. The extremity
with which Germany penalizes hate speech may lead those with
unpopular or inflammatory opinions to refrain from posting. Recently,
302. Citron, supra note 18, at 1038. On May 31, 2016, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and
YouTube entered into an agreement with the European Commission to remove “hateful” speech
within twenty-four hours if appropriate under terms of service.
303. Citron, supra note 18, at 1038.
304. See e.g., Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Meeting With European Parliament, CSPAN (May 22, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?446000-1/facebook-ceo-markzuckerberg-testifies-eu-lawmakers [https://perma.cc/5YHB-BAH4] (documenting Mark
Zuckerberg’s address to Parliament that Facebook would be “fully compliant” with the GDPR).
305. ARTICLE 19, GERMANY: THE ACT TO IMPROVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW IN
SOCIAL NETWORKS (2017).
306. See Siracusa Principles of the ICCPR para. 27, https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/
humanrights/HUMR5503/h09/undervisningsmateriale/SiracusaPrinciples.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z3KS-48U8] (“Since public morality varies over time and from one culture
to another, a state which invokes public morality as a ground for restricting human rights, while
enjoying a certain margin of discretion, shall demonstrate that the limitation in question is
essential to the maintenance of respect for fundamental values of the community.”).
307. Article 19, supra note 285, at 16.
308. Klonick, supra note 297, at 1657.
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Germany has gone as far as to use its law enforcement to raid the houses
of posters. 309 As part of a pattern of chilling political speech, a Green
Party candidate in Austria was insulted online and the European courts
held that the content was illegal and had to be removed. 310
Similarly, under NetzDG, Beatrix Von Storch was insulted online
and that content was taken down. 311 Beatrix Von Storch herself was
censored for hateful comments against Muslims on Twitter. 312 While
in itself this is not sympathetic, many German ended up running to her
side. 313 The effect is not only the chilling of political speech, but also
the creation of a sympathetic character on the far right, thus further
solidifying her views as part of the zeitgeist. 314 More sympathetically,
satirists mocking Beatrix Von Storch had their content taken down,
chilling creative and political speech. 315
Recently, countries with less noble goals have taken inspiration
from NetzDG. 316 NetzDG can seem acceptable as legislation in a
country like Germany, which holds itself to a high standard of human
rights. 317 The law is so vague, however, that its language has now been
co-opted by less good faith users. 318

309. Ruth Bender, German Police Carry Out a Nationwide Crackdown on Internet Hate
Speech, WALL STREET J. (July 12, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/german-police-carryout-nationwide-crackdown-on-internet-hate-speech-1468429275
[https://perma.cc/APR7C5PH].
310. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, supra note 102.
311. See supra notes 1-5.
312. See supra notes 1-5.
313. See supra notes 1-5.
314. See supra notes 1-5.
315. See supra notes 1-5.
316. Vidushi Marda & Stephania Milan, Wisdom of the Crowd: Multistakeholder
Perspectives on the Fake News Debate, U. PENN. INTERNET POL’Y OBSERVATORY (May 21,
2018),
http://globalnetpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Fake-News-Report_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5UK-CF5F].
317. See Beate Rudolf, Human Rights in Germany—A View from Germany’s National
Human Rights Institution, 44 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 50, 52 (2016); Stefan Oeter, International
Human Rights and National Sovereignty in Federal Systems: The German Experience, 47
WAYNE L. REV. 871, 873 (2001).
318. Germany: Flawed Social Media Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law
[https://perma.cc/B2U6-8ZEA]; Dorothee Baumann-Pauly, German Companies Report
Implementation of New Hate Speech Law, N.Y.U. STERN CTR. FOR BUS. RTS. (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://bhr.stern.nyu.edu/blogs/2018/8/7/german-companies-report-on-the-implementation-ofnew-hate-speech-law [https://perma.cc/X7XG-T7WE].
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Soon after the passage of NetzDG, Russia adopted a law similar
to the German law.319 “Manifestly unlawful” takes on new meaning
when it is paired with the intent of the Kremlin. 320 Russia, Singapore,
and the Philippines have all cited NetzDG in pending legislation that
will limit speech online. 321
These examples grow into even more extreme legislation. Poland
has passed a law banning speech about Poland’s role in the
Holocaust. 322 Poland, the country famously devastated by invading
Nazi forces during World War II, has been heavily criticized by the
international community for its complicity in deaths of the Jewish
people. 323 One of three Jews who died during the Holocaust was
Polish. 324 In 2017, the Polish government passed legislation forbidding
this criticism. 325 After public backlash (including massive outcry from
Israel), Poland amended the law. 326 It removed criminal penalties from
the statute, but it remains illegal still to speak against Polish
involvement in the Holocaust. 327
NetzDG has become the impetus not only for troubling censorship
in Germany itself, but also for global censorship around the world. As
was specified by the HRC in 2010, protection of free speech on the
internet is crucial in this day and age to the protection of expression to
319. Vanessa Strizh et al., Russia Introduces New Draft Law on Social Networks,
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/russiaintroduces-new-draft-law-on-social-networks [https://perma.cc/Q793-3ASM].
320. Bauman-Pauly, supra note 298; Don’t Pass Fake News Bill, Kremlin Human Rights
Council Urges Parliament, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.rferl.org/a/dont-pass-fake-news-bill-kremlin-human-rights-council-urgesparliament/29815217.html [https://perma.cc/BWW8-P35T].
321. Human Rights Watch, supra note 298.
322. Vanessa Gera, Polish Law Criminalizing Some Holocaust Speech Takes Effect,
ASSOC. PRESS (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/2a09f2c3d4ef4915b94aa6be620c9205
[https://perma.cc/64MU-AZ3X]; Barbora Cernusakova, Poland’s Holocaust Law Is A
Dangerous Threat to Free Speech, TIME (Mar. 9, 2018), http://time.com/5193301/polandholocaust-law-freedom-speech-amnesty/ [https://perma.cc/QU2T-G6NZ].
323. Edna Friedberg, The Truth About Poland’s Role in the Holocaust, ATLANTIC (Feb.
6, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/poland-holocaust-deathcamps/552455/ [https://perma.cc/PD3M-X5FS].
324. Id.
325. Wojciech Moskwa, Poland Softens Holocaust Law That Sparked International Fury,
BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-27/polandto-amend-holocaust-law-upending-ties-with-israel-u-s [https://perma.cc/VXB3-R5X2].
326. Jennifer Rubin, Poland Amends Holocaust Speech Law, Scrapping Jail Terms,
FRANCE 24 (Jun. 27, 2018), https://www.france24.com/en/20180627-polish-pm-backs-downholocaust-speech-law-pis-anti-semitism [https://perma.cc/E3S7-9MR7].
327. Id.

1362 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

all. 328 Media Platforms have become more concerned about limiting
fake news and hateful content from both an economic and moral
standpoint. 329 NetzDG is an extreme example of how non-American
jurisdictions have taken aim at widespread, transnational concerns of
illegal internet content. Another indication of this trend is the recent
European recent effort to codify the right to be forgotten through the
GDPR. 330 The GDPR has created mass liability for content that begs
deletion not simply in one country, but worldwide. 331
American speech online also faces more direct challenges in
foreign courts. Courts in Canada and the United States have seemingly
gone to war over the issue. Google LLC v. Esquustek Solutions Inc., a
California court held that a Canadian order to make content globally
inaccessible was unenforceable in the United States, and ordered an
injunction. 332 When Google returned to Canada with the injunction, the
Canadian judge held it was still enforceable because it did not compel
Google to “violate the law.” 333
NetzDG presents the biggest challenge through the internet
companies’ terms of service. 334 The terms of service used by social
media platforms further show the effect of transnational law on global
censorship. 335 The European Union recently signed a deal with social
media providers to ensure the exclusion of Terrorism and Radicalized,
hateful content on their sites. 336 These terms of service to not simply
apply in the European Union, but globally. 337 This is in stark contrast
to the initial stance of social media companies. 338 From the most
virulent defenders of free speech, to actual requests for self-regulation,
internet companies have shown a change of heart in the arena of
regulation.
328. See Land, supra note 131, at 54.
329. See, e.g., Charles Riley, This Is the Regulation Mark Zuckerberg Wants for Facebook,
CNN (Mar. 22, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/22/technology/regulation-political-adsfacebook-zuckerberg/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y3PZ-77T7]; Citron, supra note 270.
330. Post, supra note 153, at 986-87.
331. See Post, supra note 153, at 983 (critiquing the ECJ’s harsh analysis of Google’s
duties under the Right to be Forgotten).
332. Google LLC v. Equustek Solutions Inc., No. 5:17-CV-04207-EJD, 2017 WL
5000834, at *3 (N.D. Cal Nov. 2, 2017).
333. Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2018 BCSC 610, ¶ 20 (Can.).
334. Citron, supra note 18, at 1038.
335. Citron, supra note 18, at 1038.
336. Citron, supra note 18, at 1046.
337. Citron, supra note 18, at 1046.
338. Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 278, at 14.
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Facebook claims that it looks to whether something is in violation
of its “community guidelines” and then it evaluates whether it is
unlawful under NetzDG (in which case it would only be blocked in
Germany). 339 Presuming that that is true, NetzDG still could lead to
mass international censorship. 340 As countries grow more willing to
regulate internet platforms, social media providers have economic
incentive to push their terms of services more and more
conservative. 341 Many providers rely partially on geo-blockers, 342 but
prefer to use the mutual assent of a form contract. 343 As a result, online
content grows progressively more censored. 344
C. NetzDG: A Violation of the ICCPR
In evaluating NetzDG through a balancing test, it seems that it is
in violation of human rights law because (1) The HRC has specifically
sought to protect the internet; (2) The statute is not narrow in its speech
limitation; and (3) It gives all of the power to censor to private actors.
1. Protected Use of Technology
The Human Rights Council emphasizes that exceptions to Article
19 from 19(3) must be narrow, and the main problem with NetzDG is
that it is vast. 345 It does not provide enough guidance for what illegal
speech is. 346 It is vague in its language towards penalties, offenses, and
reporting requirements. 347
339. Network Enforcement Act (“NetzDG”), FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/285230728652028 [https://perma.cc/8GQA-CXBB].
340. Citron, supra note 18, at 1038.
341. Citron, supra note 18, at 1038.
342. This is how some content in violation of NetzDG is removed solely in Germany.
Network Enforcement Act (“NetzDG”), FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
285230728652028 [https://perma.cc/8GQA-CXBB].
343. Objectionable
Content,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/objectionable_content [https://perma.cc/J7W8-NDCB]; Removal of online
hate speech in numbers, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (Aug. 16, 2018),
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2018/08/16/removals-of-online-hate-speech-innumbers/ [https://perma.cc/B38E-W6JY].
344. Citron, supra note 18. But see Twitter Community Standards, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules
[https://perma.cc/TM4X-L6C6];
Twitter European Community Standards, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/hateful-conduct-policy [https://perma.cc/5HBE-8XHX]. Twitter’s standards are
different between Europe and the United States.
345. See NetzDG, supra note 7.
346. See NetzDG, supra note 7.
347. See NetzDG, supra note 7.
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2. “Manifestly Unlawful” Is Unacceptably Vague
The German legislature did not elaborate on the meaning of
“manifestly unlawful within NetzDG. 348 it is not a phrase on which
there is any elaboration in the document. “Manifestly unlawful” could
thus apply as narrowly as excluding child pornography immediately or
apply as broadly as excluding Beatrix Von Storch’s comments about
Muslims. The danger in the vague term lies in its influence on
platforms; without a clear definition of what must be removed within
twenty-four hours, social media platforms will over-correct.
3.

Private Actors and Overreach

Social media providers do not have a clear definition of
“manifestly unlawful,” and reporting requirements on NetzDG are
vague. The text leaves room for opaque practices. Social media
platforms are thus making the decisions about what constitutes
“manifestly unlawful” speech, or other speech generally. The German
government has effectively delegated the task of defining what speech
is legal to private, transnational actors who are quick to avoid fines.
This delegation of power means that social media companies are
determining which speech is legal and which speech is not.
V. AMERICAN STAKE IN NETZDG
In order to firmly understand what is at stake in NetzDG, it is
important to understand the failures of the United States system of
internet regulation. The United States has underregulated the internet
purposefully, but the global nature of social media makes it difficult to
escape the consequences of foreign regulation. Section V.A of this
Note will explain the American approach to regulation. 349 Section V.B
will explore the transnational problems of social media speech
regulation. 350
A.

Section 230

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act indemnifies
internet companies from any liability for third party content on their

348. See NetzDG, supra note 7.
349. See infra Section V.A.
350. See infra Section V.B.

2019]

NUTZ ABOUT NETZ

1365

platforms. 351 Initially, this provision meant to protect good faith
platforms from liability of plagiarized materials on their sites. 352 The
result reaches much farther. 353
This system presents large problems for accountability on the
internet. 354 Many websites allow for anonymous posting. While this
allows for many benefits, it also means those involved in illegal posting
may never be tracked down. 355 Generally, this is why countries like
Germany have targeted internet platforms: the platforms are in the best
position to prevent the harms.
B.

Failings to Protect People Under the American Approach

NetzDG effectively censors within German borders, but it is likely
the chilling nature of the legislation will have a transnational effect.
Thus, American law may come to clash with NetzDG. For years,
platforms have worked closer to using internet borders, 356 but it is
becoming increasingly unavoidable to contain one nation’s law against
another’s.
Most social media platforms are based in America, and for years
they have striven to keep themselves in line with free speech laws in
America, well known as the most liberal with such laws. 357 Primarily,
many internet companies seek to take advantage of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, which indemnifies internet companies
in the United States from facing liability for unlawful content on their
platforms. 358

351. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West).
352. Patricia Spiccia, The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: Why Immunity Under Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be Earned and Not Freely Given, 48 VAL. U.
L. REV. 369, 379 (2013).
353. Id.
354. Kristine L. Gallardo, Taming the Internet Pitchfork Mob: Online Public Shaming, the
Viral Media Age, and the Communications Decency Act, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 721, 728
(2017).
355. Id.
356. Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 278, at 54.
357. Ashley Smith-Roberts, Facebook, Fake News, and the First Amendment, 95 DENV.
L. REV. ONLINE 118, 123 (2018).
358. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access
to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material
is constitutionally protected. . . .”)
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The seminal case on this issue is Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme. 359 In 2006, Yahoo! found itself subject to
French laws prohibiting Holocaust denial when it was compelled to
remove a Nazi memorabilia auction site from any URL accessible in
France. 360 This included yahoo.fr and yahoo.com itself. 361 Yahoo!
sought declaratory relief in the United States to establish that the
French law was unenforceable in America due to free speech laws.362
The Ninth Circuit held that Yahoo! had an obligation to make “all
reasonable (or available) measures” to block the content in France, but
that the ban was unenforceable in the United States. 363
The fears of global norms on the internet in the Yahoo! court were
again visited in the Google v. CNIL in the ECJ. 364 The French data
protection authority sought to not only have Google delist websites
within France, but also worldwide. 365 The court rejected France’s
attempt, stating “there would be nothing to prevent other jurisdictions
from claiming the same global scope of application for their own laws.
The result would be a ‘race to the bottom,’ as speech prohibited by any
one country could effectively be prohibited for all, on a worldwide
basis.” 366
Yahoo! and CNIL are cases that seek to protect international
differences on a platform that is increasingly changing. 367 Today, these
goals grow even less realistic as the internet becomes more global.368
Media platforms have become more concerned about limiting fake
news and hateful content from both an economic and moral
standpoint. 369 NetzDG is an extreme example of how non-American
jurisdictions have taken aim at widespread, transnational concerns of
illegal internet content. Another indication of this trend is the recent
European recent effort to codify the right to be forgotten through the

359. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1202 (9th Cir. 2006).
360. Id. at 1203.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1225.
363. Id. at 1203 n.1.
364. Case C-507/17, CNIL v. Google.
365. Id. at ¶ 4.
366. Id. at ¶ 18.
367. Id. at ¶ 20.
368. See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 102.
369. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 329; Citron, supra note 270.
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GDPR. 370 The GDPR has created mass liability for content that begs
deletion not simply in one country, but worldwide. 371
Domestic sovereignty over online content is also facing more
direct challenges in international courts. Courts in Canada and the
United States have seemingly gone to war over the issue. In Google
LLC v. Esquustek Solutions Inc., a California court held that a Canadian
order to make content globally inaccessible was unenforceable in the
United States, and ordered an injunction. 372 When Google returned to
Canada with the injunction, the Canadian judge held that the original
Canadian order was still enforceable because it did not compel Google
to “violate the law.” 373
The greatest threat to national ability to control content online
comes from internet companies’ terms of service. 374 The terms of
service that create “community guidelines” for each website do not
create de jure international norms, but de facto ones. The terms of
service used by social media platforms further show the effect of
transnational law on global censorship. 375 The European Union
recently signed a deal with social media providers to ensure the
exclusion of terrorism and radicalized, hateful content on their sites.376
These terms of service to not simply apply in the European Union, but
globally. 377
VI. SOLUTIONS
Given the overbroad effects of NetzDG, it seems it is in violation
of Article 19. While Germany’s goals are compelling, they have not
sufficiently tailored the law to illegal content. 378 However, NetzDG is
legislation attempting to curtail one of the most pressing transnational

370. Post, supra note 153, at 986-87.
371. See id. at 983 (critiquing the ECJ’s harsh analysis of Google’s duties under the right
to be forgotten).
372. Google LLC v. Equustek Solutions Inc., No. 5:17-CV-04207-EJD, 2017 WL
5000834, at *3 (N.D. Cal Nov. 2, 2017).
373. Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2018 BCSC 610, ¶ 20 (Can.).
374. Citron, supra note 18, at 1041.
375. Citron, supra note 18, at 1038.
376. Citron, supra note 18, at 1038.
377. Citron, supra note 18, at 1038.
378. Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 440
(Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2010); John Currie, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 377 (Irwin Law
ed., 2001).
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issues of the twenty-first century. 379 While the law must be challenged,
there is value in preserving parts of it. Part V of this Note will explore
the different ways to attack NetzDG, as well as the ways Germany
could tailor the law to come more in line with human rights norms.380
If Germany can create a nuanced approach to hate speech online, it may
set a precedent for other countries to follow suit and tackle the growing
internet radicalization.
A. Litigation Solutions
1. Federal Constitutional Court
Germany’s Federal Constitutional Courts present Germans with
the opportunity to challenge the bill. 381 Under German Basic Law, a
German citizen could challenge this breach of rights with a civil suit.382
The suit would give Germany the opportunity to work through the
problems with NetzDG on its own.
It seems unlikely the courts in Germany will entirely strike down
NetzDG. German courts are far more deferential to the legislature than
American courts. 383 In fact, it is explicit that German Constitutional
Courts do not have the power to make law. 384 As such, the Federal
Constitutional Courts are more ambivalent about striking down
legislation.
German courts also are likely to make the type of value judgments
that would prioritize Germany’s hate speech laws over free expression
law in the context of bigoted actors. 385 NetzDG primarily takes aim at
speech that German courts do not prioritize. 386 It seems unlikely that
German courts would prove sympathetic to the inflammatory speech
often at play on social media. 387
379. Siva Vadhyanathan, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA (Oxford Univ. Press 2018) (detailing the
ever mounting problem of social media platforms and human rights violations).
380. See infra Section VI.B.1.
381. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 355.
382. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf [https://perma.cc/688H-KSP9].
383. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 160.
384. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 164 (noting that Germany vests the entirety
of lawmaking authority in the legislature). It should be noted that German Courts have taken the
authority to step further into a lawmaking role, when justice requires creative judging. See The
Princess Soraya Case (1973) 34 BVerfGE 269 (Ger.).
385. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 355.
386. See NetzDG, supra note 7.
387. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 362.
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2. Regional European Courts
EU courts could also present an enforcement mechanism that
would be useful. 388 As a regional court of human rights, ECtHR has
proven effective as a check on the powers of independent nations to
control the human rights of their people. 389 Indeed, some tout the
European Union as a model for international regional control. 390 The
European court system has more enforcement mechanisms than the
international court system, and could be a more effective check on the
power of the German government.
The European Union has recently proven that protection of
dignity and privacy is of greater importance than protection of
inflammatory speech. 391 The European Union is also working with
social media companies to establish measures similar to those in
NetzDG. The European courts have also established deferential
treatment of speech laws within each territory. 392
3. The Optional Protocol
The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) also presents a solution
because Germany assented to the Optional Protocol. 393 This solution
would give any German citizen with standing the ability to protest the
new law directly under Article 19. 394 Further, in light of the HRC’s new
emphasis on preventing censorship on the internet, there is a high
chance that they will be less receptive to NetzDG than any European
court. 395
However, even if the ICJ enforce this action against Germany, the
Optional Protocol does not present easy enforcement mechanisms.396
ICJ rulings do not have the sovereign rule of law of nation states. 397 As
such, enforcement of the ICCPR can range from greatly effective to
mere formality. 398
388. Donoho, supra note 34, at 45.
389. Donoho, supra note 34, at 45.
390. Donoho, supra note 34, at 44.
391. Post, supra note 153, at 991.
392. See Case 121/85 [1986], Conegate v. HM Customs Excise.
393. See supra note 58.
394. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
395. Rudolf, supra note 317, at 53.
396. See Donoho, supra note 34, at 26.
397. Nanda, supra note 120, at 364.
398. Id.
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4. Public Pressure
Despite difficulties of challenging NetzDG in an enforceable
action to repeal the bill, it is likely Germany will respond to intense
pressure from international organizations and foreign governments.399
Germany is deeply committed to individual rights, partially because of
its history. 400 Germany is also committed to maintaining its image as
the arbiter of human rights. 401 This commitment to its image may cause
Germany to take stock of the public reaction to the bill. Indeed,
Germany is already considering revising the bill. 402
B. Tailor the Law
One of the most important ways Germany could solve these issues
is to tailor the law. If complying with human rights standards requires
a balancing test, then Germany may be able to narrow the terms of
NetzDG so that it only regulates the targeted speech necessary to
promote the dignity interests of German citizens. This could preserve
the successful aspects of the law while limiting censorship damage.
1. Defining “Manifestly Unlawful”
The most ambiguous and dangerous portion of NetzDG is the lack
of description of “manifestly unlawful” content. 403 This is the only
content subject to the twenty-four hour removal clause, and therefore
the most prone to the chilling effects of overcorrection. 404 While
NetzDG defines the statutes which govern hate speech, it gives no
indication of when something “manifestly” violates one of these laws.
399. Article 1 of Germany’s Basic Law specifically references human rights, and the
ICCPR is incorporated into the Basic Law. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation
at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf [https://perma.cc/EV42-Z53S].
400. See Rudolf, supra note 317, at 55 (acknowledging Germany’s commitment to “never
again”); Zachary Pall, Light Shining Darkly: Comparing Post-Conflict Constitutional Structures
Concerning Speech and Association in Germany and Rwanda, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
5, 14 (2010) (noting the postwar commitment to human rights). But see Oeter, supra note 317,
at 872 (arguing that Germany does not exhibit the commitment to Human Rights law for which
it is so famous).
401. See Oeter, supra note 317, at 887.
402. See Emma Thomasson, Germany looks to revise social media law as Europe watches,
REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-hatespeech/germanylooks-to-revise-social-media-law-as-europe-watches-idUSKCN1GK1BN
[https://perma.cc/K7LH-4Q8H].
403. See supra Section III.B.
404. See NetzDG, supra note 7.
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Considering NetzDG is a law based in policing speech, a lack of
specificity can be fatal.
Germany should clarify in the statute what it means by
“manifestly unlawful.” This could, for example, pertain to child
pornography, terrorist recruitment videos, and specific threats. These
definitions would help social media providers pare down the content
they delete before reporting, and thus make it easier to distinguish what
they have time to consider taking down.
Germany could base the definition of “manifestly unlawful” in
Article 1 of the Basic Law and to Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. Article
1 holds human dignity as “inviolable.” 405 Article 19(3) allows for
restrictions on expression when there is a threat to security and the
public order. 406 If the German legislature uses this language, their
commitment to upholding freedom of expression and dignity will be
explicit. Further, it will attach NetzDG to previous Court rulings,
because there is a constitutional history of protecting dignity. Thus,
“manifestly unlawful content” should be defined as “content that
violates dignity in such an egregious manner that it materially disrupts
national security or public order.” Such a definition would give internet
companies the guidance to delete content that involves violence or
hateful propaganda, but let them consider more carefully before they
remove mere insults and satire.
2. Protecting Art and Political Dissent
Expressly carving out and protecting artistic expression could
protect NetzDG as a matter of human rights law. The ICCPR is carries
extra weight with political speech and artistic expression. 407 This
speech adds value to society. 408 Expressly identifying more heavily
protected speech in the statute could incentivize social media
companies to proceed with more caution as they delete content,
particularly that of artists. Arguably the vulgarity of Jan Böhmermann
and the Titanic are crucial to political discourse online. 409

405. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf [https://perma.cc/58LS-MGS4].
406. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 19(3).
407. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 19(2) (expressly applying expression protection to artists
in particular).
408. Oster, supra note 62, at 43.
409. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 355.

1372 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

C. Collaboration Between Sovereign and Twitter
The European Union has entered into an agreement with social
media platforms to attempt to curb the deeper issues of fake news.410
While this agreement is far from perfect, 411 active collaboration
between social media companies and government entities could be a
more beneficial way to regulate the internet. 412 Mass internet providers
and social networks are under even more pressure than the government
to regulate their content. 413
Social media providers also have the option of working on
technology that better targets hate speech. 414 Processes like the ones
being worked on at the Anti-Defamation League in the United States
to filter out hate speech more specifically without filtering political
satire or legal political speech. 415 If computer programs can gain
sufficient nuance to distinguish true hate speech as defined by German
law, it would save social media providers from the task of deciding
what speech is illegal themselves. 416
The more extreme solution to this problem is the advent of the
collective governance solutions – or a collaboration between
governments and internet companies. As of recent years, there is a
deficit of government information on the operations online platforms,
and internet companies, despite hiring counsel, do not have the clarity
of regulations to help them make determinations. 417 This could be
remedied by more active collaboration between the government and the
internet platforms creating a system that allows for government
conceptions of privacy to match with true understanding of the internet.
Partnering with good faith actors could lead to better remedies for the
root problem of protecting people online.
410. Citron, supra note 18, at 1047.
411. Id. at 1049-50.
412. Klonick, supra note 297, at 1667.
413. Klonick, supra note 297, at 1667 (noting that Facebook was forced to start regulating
itself based on mounting pressure to do so).
414. See Klonick, supra note 297, at 1667.
415. The Online Hate Index, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Jan. 2018),
https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/the-online-hate-index#introduction
[https://perma.cc/F8XM-A4VG].
416. Deletion centers themselves present problems, particularly with rate of PostTraumatic Stress Disorder amongst workers there. For more information on this, see Andrew
Arsht & Daniel Etcovitch, The Human Cost of Online Content Moderation, HARV. J. L. & TECH
(Mar.
2,
2018),
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/the-human-cost-of-online-contentmoderation [https://perma.cc/HAR3-ML9Z].
417. See Klonick, supra note 297, at 1667.
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D. Private Solutions
Internet companies are creating their own solutions to the
difficulties of content moderation as well. In the last month, Facebook
suggested that it could create its own tribunals for users to turn to when
they wished to have their content restored. 418 Facebook suggests the
body would be independent from the company, and it would render
judgments as a neutral arbiter. 419 This appellate system would solve
many of the problems with NetzDG. 420 Currently, there is not enough
oversight of content deletion. A tribunal could bring transparency to
Facebook’s process of deleting, and citizens could have a way to access
their rights online. However, such a solution would continue to give
private companies the ability to determine the law. 421 It would also not
solve these problems with Twitter, Google, Youtube, or any other
massive internet company. It would also be difficult to make it
completely independent. 422 Thus, as a solution it is ultimately flawed.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the brave new world of the internet, human beings have access
to more information and connection than ever. Bodies of human rights
law have recognized the inevitable effect of this revolution on our
human rights. NetzDG is a law that challenges human rights on Internet
platforms. It also seeks to protect the German people from the fast
radicalizing hate speech online. These issues around speech require an
evaluation of human rights law in relation to a new forum of expression
for the century. Germany, a country deeply committed to the human
rights of its people, must take care to create a more nuanced approach
to this law. As of December 2018, the German government has claimed
modest success with NetzDG, citing the reports from social media
companies of low deletion rates. 423 At the same time, the first
418. Kate Klonick, How To Make Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/opinion/facebook-supreme-court-speech.html
[https://perma.cc/7F2Z-FSJ2].
419. Id.
420. Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s New ‘Supreme Court’ Could Revolutionize Online
Speech, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-new-supremecourt-could-revolutionize-online-speech.
421. Klonick, supra note 297.
422. Klonick, supra note 297.
423. Dietmar Neurer, Minister of Justice Is Satisfied With NetzDG, HANDELSBLATT (Dec.
13, 2018), https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/gesetz-gegen-hass-im-netz-nichtalles-perfekt-aber-vieles-gut-justizministerium-zeigt-sich-zufrieden-mit-dem-netzdg/
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constitutional challenge to NetzDG is making its way through the
Federal Constitutional Court in Germany. 424 As the debate continues,
the international community must watch and see if freedom of
expression on the internet will prevail in one of its toughest battles yet.

23752306.html?share=twitter&ticket=ST-826720-6CCY1Cl4ckRNGMF4wfhD-ap1
[https://perma.cc/JXD9-5WFZ].
424. Facebook-Gesetz soll in Karlsruhe gekippt werden, DIE TAGESPOST (Nov. 24, 2018),
https://www.die-tagespost.de/feuilleton/online/Facebook-Gesetz-soll-in-Karlsruhe-gekipptwerden;art4690,193729 [https://perma.cc/6BSH-8Z3G]; Verfassungsbeschwerde gegen
NetzDG wird geprüft, DIE TAGESPOST (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.die-tagespost.de/
feuilleton/online/Verfassungsbeschwerde-gegen-NetzDG-wird-geprueft;art4690,194145
[https://perma.cc/4PCE-59RJ].

